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We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance
of an investment portfolio and the ￿exibility with which the investor can change it
in￿uence her risk attitude in markets. In line with the prediction of Myopic Loss
Aversion (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995), we ￿nd that more information and more
￿exibility result in less risk taking. Market prices of risky assets are signi￿cantly
higher if feedback frequency and decision ￿exibility are reduced.This result sup-
ports the ￿ndings from individual decision making, and shows that markets do
not eliminate such behavior.
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In February 1999 Bank Hapoalim, Israel￿s largest mutual funds manager, announced
that it intends to change its information policy towards its client-investors. The basic
idea was that the Bank would send information about the performance of its funds not
every month as it used to, but rather only once every three months. The clients will
still be able to check the performance every day if they wish, but if they do not, they
will get the information less frequently than before. The bank expected investors to be
more willing to hold assets in the mutual fund when they are less frequently informed
about the evolution of fund prices. The bank￿s intuition is that ￿investors should not
be scared by the occasional drop in prices￿.1
The bank￿s intuition corresponds closely to the concept of myopic loss aversion (MLA)
advanced by Benartzi and Thaler (1995). MLA rests on the combination of two be-
havioral concepts. The ￿rst concept is loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
which refers to the tendency of individuals to weigh losses more heavily than gains. The
second concept is mental accounting (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984), which refers to
the (myopic) methods people employ to code and evaluate ￿nancial outcomes.
A well known example, due to Samuelson (1963), can best illustrate the eﬀect of com-
bining the two concepts. Samuelson asked a colleague whether he would be willing to
accept a gamble in which there are equal chances to win $200 and to lose $100. The
colleague declined this single gamble, but at the same time expressed a willingness to
accept multiple plays of the gamble. Although such a preference may have much intu-
itive appeal, Samuelson proved a theorem, stating that if the single gamble is rejected at
every relevant wealth position, then accepting the multiple gamble is inconsistent with
expected utility maximization (see Tversky and Bar-Hillel, 1983, for further discussion).
On the other hand, Benartzi and Thaler show that such preferences may be consistent
with MLA. To illustrate, suppose that the individual is loss averse and has a utility func-
tion u(z)=z for z>0 and u(z)=2 .5z for z ≤ 0,w h e r ez is the change in wealth due to
the gamble. Then, the expected utility of one gamble is negative: 1
2(200)+ 1
2(−250) < 0.
Hence, the individual will reject one gamble, and also two gambles if each one is evalu-
ated separately. The same individual, however, accepts two gambles if (s)he evaluates
1See e.g. Yediot Hachronot, February 16, 1999 (in Hebrew).3
them in combination: 1
4(400)+ 1
2(100)+ 1
4(−500) > 0. Hence, rejecting a single gamble
while accepting two gambles is quite easily explained by the combined hypotheses of
individuals being more sensitive to losses than to gains and evaluating the outcomes of
the sequence of gambles in combination.
This combined hypothesis would also be consistent with the intuition of the Israeli bank.
In the longer run the return on the mutual fund is likely to be larger than that on bonds
or savings accounts. Occasionally, however, the return will be negative. When investors
myopically evaluate their portfolio with each new piece of price information, they will
be more likely to evaluate the mutual fund positively when the information arrives less
frequently. The return on the investment is more likely to be positive - and larger than
t h a to nb o n d s-w h e nt h er e t u r n sa r eb a s e do nal o n g e rp e r i o da n dc a l c u l a t e di nam o r e
aggregate way.
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) do not advance MLA as a marketing tool to fund managers
though, but as a potential explanation for the famous equity premium puzzle. This puz-
zle refers to the fact that, over the last century, the average real return of stocks in the
United States has been about six percentage points per year higher than that of bonds
(Mehra and Prescott, 1985). By considering the stochastic process that corresponds to
the historical pattern of stocks and bond returns and choosing parameter values for the
utility function and loss aversion parameter based on experimental evidence, Benartzi
and Thaler found that the equity premium puzzle can be resolved if it is assumed that
investors evaluate their portfolio about annually. Hence, apart from being useful to a
fund manager, myopic loss aversion would seem to be a behavioral concept with the
potential of explaining one of the most important puzzles in the ￿nance literature.
Benartzi and Thaler￿s analysis is a purely theoretical one, but recently some experi-
mental evidence in support of MLA has become available. For example, in Thaler et
al. (1997), subjects allocate their investments to two funds, one with a relatively high
mean and variance of returns (stocks) and one with a relatively low mean and vari-
ance (bonds). The experiment manipulates the evaluation period of the subjects. In
a ￿monthly￿ treatment, subjects make 200 investment decisions, each binding for one
period, and are updated on returns after each period. In a ￿yearly￿ treatment, subjects
make 25 investment decisions, each binding for 8 periods, and are updated on (aggre-
gated) returns after each 8 periods. In line with MLA, Thaler et al. ￿nd that subjects4
in the yearly treatment hold signi￿cantly more assets in the risky fund than subjects in
the monthly treatment. Barron and Erev (2000) and Gneezy and Potters (1997) obtain
similar experimental results.
Although these experimental results provide some direct evidence for MLA, they are
concerned with individual decision-making rather than market interaction. Each par-
ticipant makes her own independent decisions but these have no eﬀect on the de-
cisions of other participants or vice versa. Stocks and bonds, however, are traded
in markets. An essential feature of markets is that prices are determined by the
marginal traders. As a consequence, individual violations of the standard expected
utility theory (EUT) do not necessarily imply that market outcomes will violate EUT.2
A small number of rational agents may be enough to make market outcomes rational.
Another important issue is that market interaction will aﬀect individuals￿ experience
and information feedback. The learning process in repeated individual decision tasks
will be diﬀerent from the learning process in repeated market interaction. Traders
can learn from observing the choices of other traders and from the information con-
tained in prices. Hence, there are a number of reasons to question whether phenomena
that are observed in individual decision making will carry over to market interaction.
The current paper aims to test whether the eﬀects of MLA will also show up in a
competitive environment. In particular, we set up markets in which traders adjust their
portfolio by buying and selling a risky ￿nancial asset. In the ￿high frequency￿ treatment,
traders commit their investment for one period, and are informed about the assets￿ re-
turn after each period. In the ￿low frequency￿ treatment, they commit their investment
for three periods, and are informed about the assets￿ return only after three periods.
We ￿nd that prices of the risky asset in the low frequency treatment are signi￿cantly
higher than in the high frequency treatment. These results are in line with the results
of the individual choice experiments. Investors are more willing to invest in risky assets
if they evaluate the consequences in a more aggregated way. In our market experiment
this shows up in a positive eﬀect on prices.
2Enke (1951) provides the classic argument for why the assumption of rationality may be a good
approximation of behavior of agents in markets, but not necessarily of the description of individual
behavior. See Camerer (1992) for a more comprehensive discussion of the potential of markets to
correct anomalous individual behavior in experiments.5
2 Experimental design and procedure
We set up a market in which 8 participants can trade units of a risky asset in a se-
quence of 15 trading periods. Each unit of the asset is a lottery ticket which, at the
end of a trading period, pays 150 cents with probability 1
3,a n d0 cents with probability
2
3. At the beginning of each period, a trader is endowed with a cash balance of 200
cents and 3 units of the asset. If a trader buys a unit, the price is substracted from
her cash balance, and one unit of the asset is added to her portfolio. If a trader sells
a unit, the price is added to her cash balance and a unit is subtracted from her portfolio.
At the end of the period, the asset expires and its value is revealed through a lottery.
Traders￿ earnings for the period are then equal to: 200 + [prices received from units
sold] − [prices paid for units bought] + [number of units in portfolio at the end of the
p e r i o d ]x[ v a l u eo ft h ea s s e t( 0 or 150) as determined by the lottery]. These earnings are
then transferred to the traders￿ accumulated earnings, and the next period starts with
each trader again having a portfolio consisting of 200 c e n t si nc a s ha n d3 units of the
asset. Traders cannot use accumulated earnings from earlier rounds to buy assets.
The crucial feature of our design is that we have two diﬀerent treatments. In the ￿high
frequency￿ (H) treatment, the market opens in each of the 15 periods of the experiment,
and in each period traders can adjust their portfolio by buying and selling units, as de-
scribed above. At the end of each period, traders are informed about the realized value
of the asset for that period, and then the next period starts. In the ￿low frequency￿
(L) treatment, the market opens for trading only in the ￿rst period of a block of three
periods, that is, trading takes place only in periods 1, 4, 7, 10, and 13. In each of these
trading periods, units are traded in blocks of three. That is, if a unit is bought (sold)
at a particular price in period t, then also a unit is bought (sold) at that same price in
periods t+1 and t+2. Hence, traders ￿x their asset holdings for three periods. After
trading period t is over (with t = 1, 4, 7, 10 or 13), three independent draws determine
the values of the units in periods t, t +1and t +2 , respectively. Traders are informed
about the three realized values simultaneously. For example, they may learn that the
values of the asset in the three periods are 0, 0 and 150, but these three values are not
explicitly assigned to a particular period.
The basic idea behind the two treatments is to manipulate the period over which par-6
ticipants evaluate outcomes, in almost exactly the same way as in the individual choice
experiments of Thaler et al. (1997) and Gneezy and Potters (1997). Since the fre-
quency of portfolio adjustment and information feedback is lower in treatment L,t h e
participants in this treatment can be expected to evaluate the ￿nancial consequences of
holding units in a more aggregated way than the participants in treatment H,w h oa r e
induced to evaluate and adjust their asset holdings every period. If agents are myopic,
the horizon in treatment L may be three periods, whereas in treatment H it will be
one period. As we will argue next, such myopia induces loss averse traders to be less
willing to hold assets, and leads to lower prices of the risky asset in treatment H than
in treatment L.
To simplify matters, suppose for a moment there are only three periods, and in each
period one asset can be bought. At the end of a period, the asset expires and pays 0
with probability 2
3 and 150 with probability 1
3. Suppose a trader is characterized by a
utility function u(z)=z for z>0 and u(z)=λz for z ≤ 0,w h e r ez is the change
i nw e a l t h . W ea s s u m et h a tλ > 1. Assume that the asset trades at a price p,w i t h
0 <p≤ 50. If the trader evaluates the purchase decision for each period separately,
then with 0 <p≤ 50 she will be indiﬀerent between buying and not buying an asset
in a period if 1
3(150 − p)+2
3λ(−p)=0 ,t h a ti s ,i fpH = 150
1+2λ.N o wa s s u m et h et r a d e r
evaluates the investment in the asset over the three periods in combination, that is, she
considers to buy an asset either in all three periods or in none of the periods. Then,
with 0 <p≤ 50, (s)he will be indiﬀerent between buying and not buying an asset in
each period if 1
27(450 − 3p)+ 6
27(300 − 3p)+12
27(150 − 3p)+ 8
27λ(−3p)=0 ,t h a ti s ,i f
pL = 1350
19+8λ.F i g u r e1s h o w spH and pL as functions of λ.
The steepest curve is the graph of pH. Note that pL >p H if and only if λ > 1.T h e
basic reason for this eﬀect is that the probability that a loss will be experienced is larger
when the investments are considered in isolation (2
3) than when they are considered in
combination ( 8
27) . Thus, loss averse traders are more willing to buy the risky asset if
they evaluate the ￿nancial consequences in a more aggregated way. This will have an
upward eﬀect on the demand for the asset, and, as a consequence, the asset￿s price will
be higher. Hence, to the extent that our two treatments are successful in manipulating
the ￿mental accounting￿ of the traders, MLA would predict higher prices in treatment L
than in treatment H.I ti st h i sb a s i cp r e d i c t i o no fM L At h a tw es e to u tt ot e s ti no u r
market experiment.7
It is of interest to compare this with the predictions of standard expected utility the-
ory. Intuitively, one would expect more ￿exibility to lead to more risk taking. For
the present context, a proposition proved by Gollier, Lindsey, and Zeckhauser (1997)
is relevant. Specialized to the present context, the proposition implies that whenever
an investor who is restricted to ￿x his portfolio for several periods prefers to buy the
risky asset in the ￿rst period, then surely the investor will buy the risky asset in the
￿r s tp e r i o d( a tt h es a m ep r i c e )i fh eh a st h e￿exibility to adjust his portfolio over time.
Hence, according to expected utility theory we should expect the market price of the
asset in the ￿rst period to be at least as high in treatment H as in treatment L (pH ≥ pL).
Ten experimental sessions were run, ￿ve for each treatment. The experiment was con-
ducted using the computerized labs of Tilburg University (two sessions in each treat-
ment) and the University of Amsterdam (three sessions in each treatment). Eight sub-
jects participated in each session, except for one session in which we had 7 traders. No
subject participated more than once. Undergraduate students were recruited as subjects
through announcements in class and in the university newspaper.
Upon entering the lab, a short standard type introduction was read by the experimenter
to the subjects. Then, by drawing table numbers the subjects were randomly seated
behind computer terminals, separated by partitions. Instructions (see appendix) were
then distributed and read aloud. After that, subjects could examine the instructions
more carefully and privately ask questions. During the experiment, all amounts were
denoted in cents (with 100 cents equal to 1 Dutch guilder).
Trading took place according to standard double auction rules. Traders could submit
bids to buy and asks to sell. All traders were instantaneously informed about all bids
and asks submitted to the market. At any time during a trading period traders could
decide to buy at the lowest ask or to sell at the highest bid. When a unit was traded,
the accepted oﬀer was withdrawn from the market and all traders were informed that a
trade had occurred at that price. Units traded one by one, that is, all price oﬀers were
for one unit only. Traders could submit as many oﬀers to the market as they liked, and
sell and buy as many units as they liked. However, traders could not sell when they
had no units in their portfolio, and they could not buy when their cash balance was
insuﬃcient. Also an individual oﬀer improvement rule was enforced, requiring a new8
ask (bid) price to be lower (higher) than that trader￿s standing ask (bid).
A trial period in which participants could practice with the market rules was held before
the 15 periods of the experiment were started. A trading period lasted three minutes
in the H treatment and four minutes in the L treatment3. At the end of each trading
period a lottery was conducted. To determine whether the asset paid 0 cents or 150
cents in a period, we used a box containing three disks: two blacks and one white. The
outcome of the lottery was determined by drawing one disk out of the box. If the disk
drawn was black, the value of all units for that period was 0, and if it was white the
value was 150 cents. The disk drawn was shown to the participants and the value was
entered in the computer. In treatment L the value of the asset must be determined
for three consecutive periods. For that we used three boxes, each containing two black
disks and one white disk. One disk was drawn from each of the boxes, and these three
disks determined the values of the units in the three periods. Participants were informed
about the realization of the three lotteries simultaneously and without indicating which
draw corresponded to which period. After the value of the units was determined, sub-
jects￿ earnings for the previous period (previous three periods) were determined. Then
the next trading period started. At the end of period 15, subjects were privately paid
their total earnings. Earnings averaged 65 Dutch guilders, which at the time of the
experiment (May-June 1997) was about $35.
3R e s u l t s
Figure 2 gives a complete picture of the transacion prices in each of the 10 sessions of our
experiment. Remember that, by design, trading in treatment L takes place for blocks
of three rounds 1 − 3, 4 − 6, 7 − 9, 10 − 12 and 13 − 15. It can be seen that the prices
￿uctuate rather wildly in the early rounds of some of the sessions. See in particular
session 4 (treatment L) and session 9 (treatment H) Furthermore, some extreme prices
can be observed. In the early rounds, prices range from a low of 20 t oah i g ho f150.
Clearly, some subjects have to learn the (expected) value of holding assets. As a result,
3Treatment L had 5 trading periods, whereas treatment H had 15. We extended the trading time
in the L treatment by one minute in order to make the total time for a session in the two treatments
more similar. It is clear from the data that three minutes was more than enough for all the intended
trades to be completed without any time pressure.9
they may initially buy at too high a price or sell too low. In most of the sessions prices
stabilize fairly quickly though.
Testing the basic hypothesis (MLA: pH <p L) is a straightforward exercise. We simply
compare the transaction prices of the asset for the two treatments. Figure 3 gives the
evolution of average prices over the rounds for each of the treatments. Note that by
the design of treatment L, prices are constant within blocks of three rounds. Table 1
contains the relevant data and statistical tests. For each block of three rounds, aver-
age prices are presented for treatment H and treatment L, respectively. The ￿nal row
presents the average transaction price across all rounds.
T a b l e1 :A v e r a g eP r i c ep e rB l o c ko fT h r e eR o u n d s a
rounds Treatment H Treatment L Mann-Whitney pb
1-3 49.7 (9.4) 60.4 (16.6) 0.06
4-6 48.6 (5.8) 57.6 (10.3) 0.06
7-9 48.9 (3.7) 56.8 (5.4) 0.01
10-12 49.3 (2.4) 57.6 (3.0) 0.03
13-15 50.1 (2.2) 59.6 (3.4) 0.01
all rounds 49.3 (4.7) 58.4 (7.7) 0.01
a Standard deviations in parentheses. Averages and standard
deviations are calculated ￿rst over the transaction prices within
a round and then averaged over the rounds and sessions.
b Two-tailed signi￿cance levels with the 10 session data as units
of observations.
The results display a clear treatment eﬀect in the direction predicted by MLA. In all
rounds, average transaction prices are lower in treatment H than in treatment L.A c r o s s
all rounds the asset￿s average price is 49.3 in treatment H and 58.4 in treatment L.T h i s
diﬀerence is signi￿cant at p =0 .02 with a nonparametric two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-
test, taking the 10 session averages as units of observation. The table also shows that the
average standard deviation of prices is smaller in treatment H (4.7)t h a ni nt r e a t m e n tL
(7.7). This diﬀerence is not signi￿cant though (p =0 .33) due to substantial diﬀerences
in the variability of prices across sessions (see Figure 2).10
Apart from the diﬀerence in average prices, the aggregate data are very similar across
the two treatments. Table 2 presents some further statistics. The ￿rst row displays the
average realized value of the asset. On average the traders in treatment H were a bit
more lucky with an average asset value of 58.0 compared to Treatment L where the
average asset value was 48.0. The diﬀerence is not statistically signi￿cant though.The
second row indicates that the average number of assets traded per round per trader is
almost identical for the two treatments. Hence, our manipulation only aﬀected the price
level and not the average willingness to trade. Also the post-trade distribution of assets
across traders is very similar for the two treatments. For example, for each session we
computed the standard deviation of the asset holdings across traders. The third row of
table 2 indicates that these standard deviations are almost identical for the sessions in
Treatment H and those in Treatment L Also the average range of ￿nal allocations is
similar across the two treatments. Typically, in each session there is at least one trader
that sells all three of his or her initial assets, and a trader that buys as many assests
as he or she can aﬀord, giving a range of allocations of about 6.. The range is some-
what larger in Treatment H since the assets are somewhat cheaper here. Some traders
manage to buy four additional assets with their initial money endowment of 200 cents.
Table 2: Asset value, Number of traders, and Allocations
Treatment H Treatment L Mann-Whitney pa
Asset value 58.0 48.0 0.55
Trades per round per trader 2.23 2.18 1.00
Standard deviation of allocations 2.54 2.31 0.22
Range of allocations 6.33 5.88 0.10
a Two-tailed signi￿cance levels with the 10 session data as units of observation.
In conclusion, the results support the hypothesis (pH <p L) advanced by myopic loss
aversion. Prices of the risky asset are signi￿cantly higher when the market induces
traders to evaluate the ￿nancial consequences in a more aggregated way, i.e. over a
longer period of time.
4 Discussion
There is one empirical fact in our data that seems incongruous with myopic loss aversion,
namely that the average price of the asset in treatment L is above its expected value of11
50. This suggests that subjects are risk seeking, whereas loss aversion, at least in the
simple representation that we advanced above, implies risk aversion. An observation of
asset prices above their expected value is quite common in experimental markets, how-
ever. For example, Knez at al. (1985) ￿nd an average price of about 1.40 for a one-period
asset with an expected value of 1.25. Similar degrees of ￿over-pricing￿ are reported in
Rietz (1998), Sarin and Weber (1993), and Weber et al. (2000). Generally, the simple
explanation that subjects are risk-seeking fails on a number of other accounts. There-
fore, several other explanations have been advanced. One possibility is the presence of
an endowment eﬀect, which makes traders more reluctant to sell than they would be on
the basis of a strict evaluation of ￿nancial gains and losses. As noted by Weber et al.
(2000) predictions will much depend on whether cash endowments and asset endowments
are coded jointly or separately and on the location of the reference point(s). Another
possibility is that traders attach some value to the excitement of owning an asset (see
Conlisk, 1993). Such a ￿utility of gambling￿ would also have an upward eﬀect on prices.
Yet another related possibility is that some traders are overcon￿dent in predicting the
asset￿s realization, and put to much to weight on the probability that the asset will give
a positive value (see Barber and Odean, 2000). In this paper we cannot and do not
wish to argue for or against any of these factors. They simply underline that we do not
have a generally accepted or parsimonious behavioral theory of ￿nancial decisionmaking.
The important question of our investigation is whether and in what direction asset prices
are aﬀected by a manipulation of the information feedback and the ￿exibility of portfolio
adjustment. Our results provide strong evidence that more information feedback and
more ￿exibility reduce the price of a risky asset These results are in line with the ￿ndings
from individual decision making experiments They illustrate that intertemporal fram-
ing eﬀects matter, not just for individual decisionmaking, but also in market settings.
Expected Utility Theory predicts that traders will generally like an asset better if they
can adjust their holdings in it more ￿exibly (Gollier et al. 1997). Myopic Loss Aversion,
on the other hand, predicts that traders will like an asset better if they evaluate its return
in a more aggregated way (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). The direction of the price eﬀect
we ￿nd is in line with the prediction from MLA, and opposite to the one from EUT At
the same time, it is clear that MLA can only be a ￿rst step toward a behavioral theory
of (intertemporal) framing issues in ￿nancial decisionmaking. For example, it is not
trivial to explain the overpricing that we and others observed. Furthemore, Langer and12
Weber (2000) outline conditions under which a longer evaluation period leads to less risk
taking. Yet, we believe that the importance of this ongoing debate is strengthened by our
￿nding that these framing issues do not simply disappear in a competitive environment.
Clearly, there remains room for further research into the mechanism and the conditions
w h i c ht r i g g e ra ni n c r e a s ei nr i s kt a k i n gi ff e e d b a c ko r￿exibility is reduced. The economic
signi￿cance of the phenomenon should be evident, however. The equity premium puzzle
or the communication strategy of funds managers (like Bank Hapoalim, mentioned in
the introduction) are only two out of a myriad of examples where risk taking, ￿exibility
and information provision interact. Other examples would include the trade-oﬀ between
￿exibility and interest paid on bank deposits, the risk pro￿le of individual portfolios, or
the choice of investment projects. The fact that the nature of the interaction between
risk taking, ￿exibility and information provision is diﬀerent from what received economic
theory would predict aﬀects both economic analysis and ￿nancial advice based on these
models.13
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Appendix: Instructions
(Translation from Dutch with text for treatment L in square brackets.)
Preliminary
This is an experimental study of market decision making. The instructions are simple
and if you follow them carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money. The
money you earn wil be paid to you, privately and in cash, immediately after the exper-
iment. We will ￿rst go through the instructions together. After that, you will get the
opportunity to study the instructions at your own pace, and to ask questions. Then we
will have a practice round, before we start the experiment.
The market
In a few moments you will be a trader in a market. The market will consist of 15
succesive rounds. In the market there will be trading in so-called units (of a virtual
security). These units all have the same value. This value, however, will be determined
and announced only at the end of the round, after the trading has stopped. With a
chance of 1
3 (33%) the value of each unit will be D￿.1 . 5 0( 1 5 0c e n t s ) ,a n dw i t hac h a n c e
of 2
3 (67%) this value will be equal to D￿. 0.00 (0 cents). How this value is determined,
will be explained later.
At the beginning of each round you will start with a certain starting-portfolio,w h i c h
consists of a number of units and a money balance. Every participant knows her or his
own starting-portfolio, but not that of the other participants. Your starting-portfolio
may be identical to that of other participants, but it may also be diﬀerent. However,
your starting-portfolio will be identical in each of the 15 rounds.
As soon as a round has started you can try to sell units, or you can try to use your
money balance to buy units. If you sell a unit, the price you receive will be added to the
money balance in your portfolio and the number of units in your portfolio is reduced by
one. If you buy a unit, the price you pay is deducted from the money balance in your
portfolio and one unit is added to your portfolio.
Your resulting earnings in a round are equal to:16
the money balance in your starting portfolio
+ the prices you receive for units sold
− the prices paid for units bought
+ number of units in your portfolio at end of round x value per unit (0 or 1.50)
Buying and selling
Buying and selling of units on the market will be processed by means of the computer.
All relevant information will be available on your computer screen. You can now see
what this screen will look like.
In the top left you can see what your total earnings are up to that moment. Also you
can see the number of the round we are in and the time left for trading in that round.
In each round the total time for trading is 3 minutes [4 minutes].
In the middle part of the screen you will see two columns with the current asks- and
bids. Each ask price in the column indicates that someone is prepared to sell one unit
at that price. Each bid price in the column indicates that someone is prepared to buy
one unit at that price. Both ask- and bid prices will be ordered from high to low. Your
own ask and bid prices are indicated with an asterisk.
If you want to buy a unit you can do two things. (1) You can press P (purchase). You
then buy one unit at the lowest ask price that is in the column at that moment. (2) You
can press B (bid) en enter a bid price at which you are prepared to buy a unit. If your
bid price is the lowest in the column, then you have a chance that someone is prepared
to sell at that price and will accept your bid price.
Also if you want to sell a unit you can do two things. (1) You can press S (sell). You
then sell one of your units at the highest bid price that is in the queue at that moment.
(2) You can press A (ask) and enter an ask price at which you are prepared to sell one
unit. If your ask price is the lowest in the column, then you have a chance that someone
is prepared to buy at that price and will accept your ask price.
At the bottom of the screen you see a row in which the prices of all the traded units will
be indicated. So everyone can see how many units have been traded up to that moment17
and at which prices. However, you cannot see which participants have bought or sold
units.
The box on the right of your screen displays information about your portfolio.A tt h e
top your starting-portfolio is indicated, consisting of a certain money balance and a
number of units. Then you see a list of the units that you have bought or sold and at
what price. At the bottom of the box you can see what your current portfolio looks
like. Each time you sell a unit, the price is added to your money balance and one unit
is deducted from your portfolio. Each time you buy a unit, the price is deducted from
your money balance and one unit is added to your portfolio.
Restrictions
You can buy and sell as many units as you want. There are a number of restrictions,
however.
(1) You cannot sell a unit if your portfolio does no longer contain any units.
(2) You cannot buy a unit if your money balance does not suﬃce to pay the price.
(3) When buying units you cannot use money that you have earned in previous rounds.
(4) You cannot withdraw ask and bid prices once they are entered!
(5) If you want to enter a bid price, then it must be higher than your previous bid price.
If you want to enter a new ask price, then it must be lower than your previous ask price.
[Finally, there is the following important restriction. Although the experiment consists
of 15 rounds, there will be trading in rounds 1, 4, 7, 10 and 12 only. By buying and
selling units in a round with trading, you determine your portfolio for that round, but
also for the subsequent two rounds. In other words, you always ￿x your portfolio for
three rounds. This means that your portfolio at the end of round 1 (consisting of a
money balance and a number of units) will be identical to your portfolio at the end of
round 2 and round 3. In rounds 2 and 3 there will be no trading. This means that if
you buy (or sell) a unit at a certain price in round 1, you also buy (or sell) a unit at
that same price in rounds 2 and 3. Thereafter, your trading in round 4 determines your
portfolio in rounds 4, 5 and 6. And the same will happen for rounds 7-8-9, 10-11-12,
and 13-14-15. Yet, the value of the units (0 or 1.50) will be determined separately for
each round, also within each block of three rounds. ]18
The value of the units
At the end of a round each unit has the same value. After the time for trading is over,
this value will be determined as follows. The assistant has a can with three disks. Two
of the disks are black; one is white. At the end of the round the assistant will ￿rst ￿ll
the can with the three disks, and then randomly draw one disk. If the disk drawn is
black (chance 2
3), then the value of all units in that round is 0; if the disk drawn is white
(chance 1
3), then the value of all units in that round is 1.50. Your earnings in a round
will thus be equal to the money balance in your portfolio at the end of the round plus
the total value of the units in your portfolio.
[ As explained, in a trading round you ￿x your portfolio for the next three rounds.
Therefore, at the end of the trading round, three times the assistant will draw a disk
from a can containing two black and one white disk. The colors of the three disks drawn
determine the values of the units in the ensuing three rounds. Each white disk drawn
implies that in one of the three rounds the value of the units is 1.50; each black disk
drawn implies that in one of the three rounds the value of the units is 0. ]
Summary
The experiment consists of 15 rounds. In each round you start with a portfolio consisting
of a certain number of units and a certain money balance. You can alter your portfolio
by buying and selling units. You can try to buy units by entering a bid price (press B)
and sell units by entering an ask price (press A). Also you can buy by accepting the
lowest ask price (press P) and you can sell by accepting the highest bid price (press S).
[ The market is open for trading only in rounds 1, 4 ,7, 10 and 12. If you buy or sell
a unit in one these ￿ve rounds, then you also buy or sell a unit in the subsequent two
rounds. Hence, you always ￿x your portfolio for three consecutive rounds. ]
All units have the same value in a round. With a chance of 1
3 (33%) this value is equal
to 1.50 and with a chance of 2
3 (67%) this value is equal to 0. This value is determined
at the end of the round when the assistant draws one disk from a can containing one
white and two black disks.19
The total value of the units in your portfolio is added to the money balance in your
portfolio and determines how much you earn in that round. At the end of the exper-
iment, your earnings per round are added and determine how much you earn for your
participation.
Final remarks
At the end of today￿s meeting, you will be called by your table number to collect your
earnings one by one, privately and in cash. Your earnings are your own business; you
do not have to discuss them with anyone.
It is not allowed to talk or communicate with other participants in any way during the
experiment. If you have a question, please raise your hand, and I will come to your
table to answer your question. If you have any remarks about the experiment or about
your decisions, please use the form labelled ￿REMARKS￿ that is on your table.
B = enter a Bid price P =P u r c h a s ea tl o w e s ta s kp r i c e
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Figure 3. Average prices per round for each treatment